CHAP. 2. Judicial Control of Powers 313
whose departments are responsible for the execution of a policy
which may be opposed to the interests of an opposing party cannot
easily be solved; for it is important that the interests of the general
public should be safeguarded as well as those of the individual
applicant or objector. It is essential that a court shall be without -
bias, through fear, favour or other interest; but a dispute arising as an
incident in the administration of a public service cannot, by reason
solely of prejudice to private rights, be isolated from the general
responsibility of the department concerned. Where a Minister has
to decide such a dispute, it is all important that he should explain
the reasons by which he seeks to justify his decision, if it is adverse
to the private citizen concerned. The explanation may not satisfy,
but it will at least prevent an abuse of the power which might result
from an absence of any obligation to justify it. Dictators do not
explain; responsible administrators can and should justify their
actions. But, as yet, there is no general rule of law to require this.
An equally elementary principle of justice is that no party ought Audidteram
to have his case decided without being afforded an opportunity of P^rtem'
hearing the case which he has to meet as well as stating his own case.
"Even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he
was called upon to make his defence. *Adam,' says God, 'where art
thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree that thou shouldst not eat?**n
In Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863), 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180;
K. & L. 366, the court held invalid a demolition order, justifiable in
itself, which was made by the Board without giving notice to the
owner of the property or affording him an opportunity of being
heard. There is, however, no obligation, unless a statute so provides,2
that a hearing should be oral: Local Government Board v. Arlidge,
ante. Even in a court of law evidence may in proper circumstances
be given by affidavit.
The audi alter am par tern rule is not observed where evidence is Housing Acts
given by one party without an opportunity being given to the other Cases,
party to contradict it. The application of this principle has caused
difficulty where the Minister of Health has under the Housing Acts
both executive and quasi-judicial duties. In Errington v. Minister
of Health? [1935] 1 K.B. 249, the court quashed an order of the
Minister because of a failure to act quasi-judicially. The Minister
was empowered under the Housing Act, 1930,4 to confirm, after
1 Dr. Bentlefs Case (1723), 1 Stra. 557.
* E.g. Electricity Supply Act, 1919, s. 22 (1), which provided a right of being
heard.
3 For comment on this decision, see Frost v. Minister of Health, [1935]
1 K.B. 286, and Note by E. C. S. Wade in 51 L.Q.R. 417; see also Robins &
Son, Ltd. v. Minister of Health, [1939] 1 K.B. 537; Stafford v. Minister of Health,
T1946] K. B. 621.
4 See now Housing Act, 1936,3rd Schedule.